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Abstract
This is an investigation of M. Dummett’s claim that a theory of meaning based
on verification conditions should lead to the abandonment of classical logic in
favor of intuitionistic logic. I especially concentrate on his suggestion in Dum-
mett [1] that, in order to give the meaning of negations and conditionals, we
should also take on board falsification conditions. Taken seriously, however, this
route takes us not to intuitionistic logic, but rather to one of the Nelson logics.
Michael Dummett has argued that a theory of meaning expressed in terms of
truth conditions that might be beyond our recognitional grasp cannot make
sense of how we acquire and use language1. For Dummett, the prime example
of a more adequte semantic theory is the account of mathematical statements
in Brouwer’s intuitionism: Such a statement is true only if it is constructively
provable, which brings the intuitionists to reject certain classical inferences and
laws, chief among them the Law of Excluded Middle (⊧ (A ∨ −A) ): We can’t
assume that for every mathematical statement, we will eventually come across a
proof of it or its negation, therefore this classical tautology can not be assumed.
The so called Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation (BHK for short) of
intuitionistic logic spells out the meanings of the logical constants directly in
terms of proofs:
• c is a proof of A∧B iff c is a pair (c1, c2) such that c1 is a proof of A and
c2 is a proof of B
• c is a proof of A ∨B iff c is a pair (i, c1) such that i = 0 and c1 is a proof
of A or i = 1 and c1 is a proof of B
1Parts of this argument can be found in most of his papers and books. Here, the essay
“What is a Theory of Meaning (II)”, reprinted in 1, is taken as the primary source.
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• c is a proof of A ⊃ B iff c is a construction that converts each proof d of
A into a proof c(d) of B
• nothing is a proof of $
• c is a proof of −A iff c is a construction which transforms each proof of A
into a proof of $ .
$ is a mathematical absurdity, such as 1 = 0.
A formal semantics that corresponds to this interpretation was given by S.
Kripke:
A Kripke-model for intuitionistic logic is a structure, [W,≤, v], where W is a set
of worlds or information states, ≤ is a partial order on these worlds.
The valuation function v assigns a truth value, 1 or 0, to each atomic statement
p at each world2, satisfying a heredity constraint :
For each p: if w ≤ w’ and vw(p) = 1 then vw′(p) = 1 .
Now, for the truth conditions of the logical operators:
For all w !W :
w ⊩1 A ∧B iff w ⊩1 A and w ⊩1 B
w ⊩1 A ∨B iff w ⊩1 A or w ⊩1 B
w ⊩1 A ⊃ B iff for all x ≥ w, x ⊩0 A or x ⊩1 B
w ⊩1 −A iff for all x ≥ w, x ⊩0 A
Consequence is defined as follows:
Γ ⊧ A iff in every model and every w ∈ W , if w ⊧1 B for every B ∈ Γ, then
w ⊧1 A.
Given these semantics, it is not hard to show the characteristic features of
intuitionistic logic: Excluded Middle (⊧ (A ∨ −A) of course fails. Furthermore,
even though double negation introduction holds ( ⊧ A ⊃ −−A) , double negation
elimination fails (⊭ −−A ⊃ A), as well as one of the de Morgan’s Laws (−(A∧B) ⊭(−A ∨ −B)).
It is Dummett’s aim to bring the ideas of intuitionistic mathematics to other,
more empirical subject matters. Transferred to those empirical subject mat-
ters, the intuitionistic mathematician’s quest for proofs is replaced by a quest
for verifications. The content of a statement, so the verificationistic theory of
meaning, is given by what would verify it.
2For vw(p) = 1 I will write w ⊩1 p, and for vw(p) = 0 I will write w ⊩0 p .
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An important part of this idea is that some BHK-style interpretation of the
logical vocabulary in terms of verifications can be given. The most straightfor-
ward adaptation would be simply to write “verification” instead of “proof” in
the BHK-clauses. $ would be taken to be some empirical absurdity, such as the
claim that every sentient being is actually a cactus.
Dummett, however, is not quite happy with the resulting interpretation:
[A] proof of the negation of any arbitrary statement then consists of an effective
method for transforming any proof of that statement into a proof of some false
numerical equation. Such an explanation relies on the underlying presumption
that, given a proof of a false numerical equation, we can construct a proof of any
statement whatsoever. It is not obvious that, when we extend these conceptions
to empirical statements, there exists any class of decidable atomic statements
for which a similar presumption holds good; and it is therefore not obvious that
we have, for the general case, any similar uniform way of explaining negation
for arbitrary statements.
It would therefore remain well within the spirit of a theory of meaning of this
type that we should regard the meaning of each statement as being given by
the simultaneous provision of a means for recognizing a verification of it and a
means for recognizing a falsification of it, where the only general requirement
is that these should be specified in such a way as to make it impossible for any
statement to be both verified and falsified. (Dummett [1]p.71)
The new concept to enter the picture, then, is that of falsification. There is no
indication that he thought that this move would have any effect on the logic,
i.e. that anything else than intuitionistic logic should supply the correct rules
of inference in this case. However, if we proceed in the most natural way here,
we are not at all lead to intuitionistic logic.
To see what the logic will turn out to be, we have to ask not just for the
verification, but also for the falsification conditions of compound statements.
It is very plausible to say that a conjunction is falsified by a falsification of either
conjunct and a disjunction by a falsification of the first and a falsification of the
second disjunct.
The most natural interpretation of what Dummett says about negation is this:
A negation is verified (falsified) if the negated statement is falsified (verified).
The conditional, as Dummett also notes in the essay, has a very clear falsifica-
tion condition as well: The antecedent has to be verified, the succedent falsified.
For the verification condition, the question is not all that clear, but the under-
standing of intuitionistic logic seemed to give a good approximation.
We can once again collect and express the preceding thoughts in a list of BHK-
style clauses:
• c is a verification of A∧B iff c is a pair (c1, c2) such that c1 is a verification
of A and c2 is a verification of B
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• c is a falsification of A ∧B iff c is a pair (i, c1) such that i = 0 and c1 is a
falsification of A or i = 1 and c1 is a falsification of B
• c is a verification of A ∨B iff c is a pair (i, c1) such that i = 0 and c1 is a
verification of A or i = 1 and c1 is a verification of B
• c is a falsification of A∨B iff c is a pair (c1, c2) such that c1 is a falsification
of A and c2 is a falsification of B
• c is a verification of A ⊃ B iff c is a procedure that converts each verification
d of A into a verification c(d) of B
• c is a falsification of A ⊃ B iff c is a pair (c1, c2) such that c1 is a verification
of A and c2 is a falsification of B
• c is a verification of −A iff c is a falsification of A
• c is a falsification of −A iff c is a verification of A
These clauses (together with the demand that nothing should be both verified
and falsified) correspond to the Nelson logic N3, developed independently and
in different guises by David Nelson (Nelson [4]) and Franz von Kutschera (2)
(cf. López-Escobar [3] and Wansing [6] ). We will go straight to the Kripke
semantics:
A model for N3 is once again a structure [W,≤, v], W again being a set of
partially ordered (≤) worlds andv a valuation function from formulas to 1 and
0. This time, though, we allow v to be a partial function3.
We will have hereditary constraints for both 1 and 0:
For all p, and all worlds w and w′, if w ≤ w′ and w ⊩1 p, then w′ ⊩1 p, and
for all p, and all worlds w and w′, if w ≤ w′ and w ⊩0 p, then w′ ⊩0 p.
As w ⊩0 A is not equivalent to w ⊮1 A, we have to give separate clauses for ⊩1
and ⊩0 when defining the connectives:
w ⊩1 A ∧B iff w ⊩1 A and w ⊩1 B
w ⊩0 A ∧B iff w ⊩0 A or w ⊩0 B
w ⊩1 A ∨B iff w ⊩1 A or w ⊩1 B
w ⊩0 A ∨B iff w ⊩0 A and w ⊩0 B
3If we want to give up the requirement that there are no statements that are both verified
and falsified, we are lead to the system N4, which utilizes a valuation relation instead of a
function, i.e. allows for the assignment of both 1 and 0 to statements.
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w ⊩1 A ⊃ B iff for all x ≥ w, x ⊮1 A or x ⊩1 B
w ⊩0 A ⊃ B iff w ⊩1 A and w ⊩0 B
w ⊩1 −A iff w ⊩0 A
w ⊩0 −A iff w ⊩1 A
As for consequence:
Γ ⊧ A iff in every model and every w ∈ W , if w ⊩1 B for every B ∈ Γ, then
w ⊩1 A.
This logic has been studied extensively in Wansing [6, 7], Odintsov [5] . Some
characteristics of it are: Excluded Middle fails, just like in intuitionistic logic,
but unlike intuitionistic logic, both double negation laws and the de Morgan
laws are all valid.
An unusual feature of N3 is that −(A ∧ −A) is not valid. This corresponds
to the failure of Excluded Middle, and it is instructive to see how close the
connection is. −(A∧−A) will be true if there is a falsification of (A∧−A). Such
a falsification, under the present proposal, will consist in either a falsification of
A or a falsification of −A. It would be just as preposterous to claim to be able
to be able to supply either a falsification for every statement or its negation as
it was preposterous to claim to be able to verify either of them. Therefore, in a
theory based on verifications and falsifications, both ⊧ (A∨−A) and ⊧ −(A∧−A)
will have to go.
How about ⊧ − − A ⊃ A and−(A ∧ B) ⊧ (−A ∨ −B)? The thought that there
is something non-constructive about these (especially double negation elimi-
nation) is deeply ingrained. However, given the new explanation in terms of
verifications and falsifications, there is no reason to object to either of them
from a constructivist point of view.
Moreover, given that Dummett wants to revise everyday logic, the closer the
constructive logic comes to embracing intuitive valid reasoning, the easier it will
become to swallow this pill. Double negation elimination and the intuitionisti-
cally invalid de Morgan law constitute inferences that are commonly felt to be
valid, so this seems to speak rather favourably for the adoption of Nelson logic.
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